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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution 
sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent 
history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We 
demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy 
losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for 
other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by 
discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider 
reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate 
unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory 
information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the mid-1980s, Britain pioneered an extensive privatisation and market-based reform 
of the state-owned industries. A particular aspect of the British reform that has attracted 
much attention has been the use of restructuring, competition, and independent 
regulation in infrastructure and network industries such as telecoms, transport, and 
energy including the electricity industry. 
 
These reformed industries consist of potentially competitive and natural monopoly 
network activities. The reforms have separated these activities followed by introduction 
of competition in the former and by regulating the latter. The aim of network regulation 
is to facilitate competition over the networks based on non-discriminatory access to 
these and to improve their efficiency. An innovative and important part of the regulation 
of natural monopoly networks has been the use of an incentive-based regulatory regime 
which, in the absence of competition, attempts to mimic competitive market pressures. 
 
The effects of incentive-based regulation can best be assessed in the long-run as the 
firms need time to adjust to their new operating environment and the sector regulators 
must gain experience. The length and features of the British reform make it relevant for 
drawing useful lessons for other countries. The aim of this paper is to assess the context, 
process, and performance of the British model of incentive-based regulation of 
electricity distribution networks. 
 
We then draw lessons of experience for other countries and in particular in non-
reforming countries. Since the British reform, many countries around the world and 
Europe have embarked on reforming their sectors with the latter partly driven and 
coordinated by the European Commission’s Electricity Directives. Many other countries 
however lag behind in their progress with reform as a result of unsuccessful reform 
proposals and or because they lack the sort of pressure that being directly bound by the 
Electricity Directives give. For example, the Swiss sector is the least reformed sector in 
the OECD-Europe and is one for which this paper may be directly relevant. 
 
The next section discusses the main aspects of incentive-based regulation and 
benchmarking of electricity distribution networks. Section 3 consists of a review of the 
background and the experience with distribution network regulation in Britain. Section 
4 describes the five-year distribution price control reviews since the privatisation of the 
industry. Section 5 addresses some specific issues of importance in distribution network 
regulation. Section 6 draws some general lessons from experience for other countries. 
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2. Incentive-Based Regulation and Benchmarking of Electricity 
Distribution Networks 
 
2.1 The electricity industry 
 
Electricity is an indispensable part of modern social and economic life. A reliable and 
efficient electricity industry is crucial for economic development and competitiveness. 
The electricity sector is a network industry comprising distinct but inter-related 
activities with many actors whose production and consumption decisions affect the 
operation of the whole system. 
 
The electricity system consists of generation, transmission, distribution and supply (or 
retailing) activities. Generation comprises production and conversion of electric power. 
Transmission involves long distance transportation of electricity at high voltage. 
Distribution is transportation of low voltage electricity through local networks and 
consists of overhead lines, cables, switchgear, transformers, control systems and meters 
to transfer electricity from the transmission system to customers’ premises. The supply 
function consists of metering, billing, and sale of electricity to end-users. The 
generation and supply activities are generally regarded as potentially competitive while 
the transmission and distribution networks are characterised as natural monopolies. 
 
The network characteristics of the industry and economies of coordination among the 
different activities led to creation of vertically integrated structures in many electricity 
sectors. At the same time, end-users are diverse - including residential, commercial, and 
industrial consumers - with different usage patterns with different economic values 
attached to their consumption, Moreover, the strategic importance of the sector and 
public service view of provision of electricity often justified public ownership of the 
industry. 
 
Electricity is a technically homogeneous and non-storable product and system reliability 
requires that supply and demand are matched simultaneously. At the same time, the 
electricity industry is highly capital intensive with much of the assets becoming sunk 
costs upon investment. As the existing assets in place need to be renewed and demand 
continuously increases, the sector can experience investment cycles. At the same time, 
the assets have long economic lives with long-term implications for the composition of 
the sector. 
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The electricity reforms have generally regarded the generation and supply activities as 
potentially competitive while the transmission and distribution networks are natural 
monopoly activities that need to be regulated. 
 
 
2.2 Electricity sector reforms and incentive regulation 
 
Since the mid-1980s, a world-wide reform trend has transformed the institutional 
framework, organisation, and operating environment of the infrastructure and network 
industries including electricity. This has given rise to considerable interest in incentive-
based regulation of the natural monopoly segments of the reformed industries. 
 
In the electricity sector, reforms have involved measures such as privatisation, 
establishment of sector regulators, introduction of competition into generation, design 
of organised wholesale and retail markets, and unbundling of generation, transmission, 
distribution, and retail activities (Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002). Incentive regulation 
must therefore be viewed within the wider context of regulatory reform of the sector.1
 
Moreover, some shortcomings in the incentive properties of the traditional rate-of-return 
(ROR) regulation, most notably over-capitalisation of the regulatory asset base shown 
by Averch and Johnson (1962) were also apparent prior to the reforms. The trend 
towards sectoral reforms and the renewed interest in regulation have led to advances in 
the theoretical and conceptual aspects of incentive regulation as an alternative to the 
traditional rate-of-return or cost-of-service regulation.2
 
From an economic point of view, the aim of electricity reform in general and incentive 
regulation of networks in particular is to provide utilities with incentives to improve 
their operating and investment efficiency and to ensure that consumers benefit from the 
gains. Within this context, the aim of incentive regulation is to achieve these objectives 
through financial reward or penalty incentive schemes. Shleifer (1985) suggests that 
incentive regulation can mimic the outcome of the markets by setting an external 
performance standard that represents some average industry performance excluding the 
firm in question. 
 
1 As such, the theory and empirical evidence on the merits of private ownership and privatization in the 
context of market-oriented infrastructure reforms can be characterized as inconclusive (Jamasb et al., 
2004a; Mota, 2004; Zhang et al., 2002). However, when accompanied by effective regulation, 
privatization has achieved efficiency improvements. 
2  In the US, incentive regulation is often referred to as Performance Based Regulation (PBR). 
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The most widely discussed and adopted schemes are based on price cap, revenue cap, 
yardstick regulation, and targeted-incentive regulation models. Other incentive models 
include sliding scale, menu of contracts, and partial cost adjustment. In practice, 
regulators have adopted a variety of approaches to incentive regulation and many 
incentive schemes use a combination of different models. 
 
 
3. The British Electricity Sector Reform and the Regulation of 
Distribution Networks 
 
3.1 The Historical Context 
 
The history of public utilities and network industries and their regulation in Britain 
constitutes a remarkable tale. In 1812, public supply of town gas began and rapidly 
developed into a competitive industry with many firms involved. The “wasteful" 
competition” was ended by the 1860 Metropolis Gas Act making provisions for 
establishing local natural monopolies. The industry also saw alternative incentive 
regulation schemes offered to the firms such as a basic price system, maximum prices, 
and sliding scales (see Hammond, et al. 2002; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986).3 The 
post-1945 period then witnessed the nationalisation of municipal and private utilities 
and infrastructure industries. Finally, the period between the late-1980s until mid-1990 
was characterised by the privatisation of these industries and the return of incentive 
regulation. 
 
The first known case of incentive regulation of network utilities dates back to 1855 and 
the sliding scale plan in Britain approved in the Sheffield Gas Act for the Sheffield 
Company a supplier of town gas. This was followed by a similar plan in 1893 for the 
electricity industry. The first case in the US is the sliding scale scheme in Boston Plan 
of 1906 for the price of gas. The above scheme was later abundant due to high inflation 
rates which followed its implementation (Schmidt, 2000). 
 
The history of electricity supply industry (ESI) in Britain dates back to the late 
nineteenth century. Electric light first emerged as the fourth generation lighting 
technology to replace other sources of lighting, such as town gas, as the modest modern 
3 The basic price system was based on fixed prices and dividends. When actual revenue would be lower 
than the allowed revenue by the basic price, a specified portion of the difference between the basic and 
actual revenue would be shared between the shareholders (as extra dividends) and employees (as 
bonuses). Under the sliding scale system, lower prices would be rewarded by higher dividends (for 
detailed descriptions see Hammond et al, 2002). 
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source of energy to this date.4 Initially, the expansion of electric lighting was slow due 
to existence of relatively cheaper and well developed town gas system (Byatt, 1979). 
The origins of the regulation of the industry with respect to matters such as licensing, 
obligation to serve, pricing, reliability, safety, and theft, etc. date back to the early 
formation days of the industry (House of Commons, 1882). Despite considerable 
technological progress in the industry, the role of distribution networks within the ESI 
has, since the inception years of the industry, largely remained unchanged.5
 
The first public electricity supply companies in Britain were a small hydro-electric plant 
established in Godalming, Surrey in 1881 and a supply company in Brighton in 1882 
(Chesshire, 1996). From its formation until nationalization in 1947, the industry was 
fragmented and based on a large number of small private or municipal companies. In 
1926, the Central Electricity Board (CEB) was established and mandated to build a 
national high-voltage grid, standardize the frequencies across the distribution system, 
and oversee the planning and construction of new generation capacity. The completion 
of National Grid in 1933 and integration of some local distribution networks contributed 
to cost and reliability improvement of electricity supply (Fouquest and Pearson, 2006). 
However, in 1933-34, there were still a total of 635 distribution undertakings one-third 
of which operated with nineteen different voltages. Also, about 400 of the undertakings 
accounted for less than 10 percent of the total sales of distribution undertakings (Chick, 
1995). 
 
The proliferation of a large number of small scale utilities was to a great extent the 
result of failure on the part of the central government to define a proper framework for 
the organization of public utilities and therefore leaving the matter largely in the hands 
of municipalities (Byatt, 1979). At the time of nationalization there were still 569 
distribution entities of which only two-fifths were directly supplied by the grid. 
Nationalisation brought the private and municipal utilities under the state ownership. 
Moreover, nationalisation consolidated the fragmented structure of the industry into the 
British Electricity Authority (BEA) responsible for generation and bulk transport of 
electricity and sixteen independent Area Electricity Boards (AEBs) in England (12), 
Wales (2), and Scotland (2) in charge of distribution, metering, billing, and customer 
service functions (Chesshire, 1996). 
 
4 Lighting by candles, gas, and kerosene represented the first, second, and third generation of lighting 
technologies correspondingly (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006). 
5 Although, due to progress on various generation and network technologies and active networks, the 
future role of electricity distribution networks is expected to undergo major changes (see. Jamasb, Nuttall, 
Pollitt, 2006 for a review of the future technologies). 
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The nationalization of the electricity industry took place within the backdrop of a wider 
nationalisation of a number of key industries in the years following the Second World 
War (Bliss, 1954; Chick, 1995; Millward and Singleton, 1995). In the run up to 
privatization and reform of the sector in 1990, the ESI achieved significant 
improvement in labour productivity partly due to the capital intensive nature of the 
industry. However, total factor productivity only showed modest gains and the industry 
was less efficient in relation to those of countries such as the US and France (Pryke, 
1981). Nationalisation, however, greatly facilitated the standardization of the system as 
in France while the standardization of the fragmented system in Germany took longer 
(Helm, 2003). The standardization and rationalization of the sector after nationalization 
provided a sector structure that was more suitable for the privatization of the industry 
later on. 
 
 
3.2 The UK 1990-Reform and its effect on distribution regulation 
 
The UK government’s intention to introduce legislation to allow private companies to 
provide electricity was clear as early as 1982 (Electricity Consumers’ Council, 1982). In 
February 1988, the government laid out its plans for the industry in the White Paper 
Privatising Electricity (Secretary of State for Energy, 1988). The White Paper stated 
that competition would ‘create downward pressures on costs and prices, and ensure that 
the customer comes first’.6
 
As with the nationalization, the privatization and reform of the electricity sector in 
Britain took also place against the backdrop of a general political paradigm shift in the 
1980s toward withdrawal of state involvement in economic activity and ownership of 
key industries (Vickers and Yarrow, 1993). At the same time, an economic paradigm 
shift was emerging in favour of implementing market mechanisms in infrastructure and 
network industries traditionally viewed as vertically integrated natural monopolies. 
Both of the paradigm shifts applied to the electricity supply industry. 
 
The British electricity reform involved all the elements of a full sector reform including 
restructuring, privatization, regulation, and competition. An independent regulator 
Office of Energy Regulation (Offer) was established in 1990. Later in 1999, Offer 
merged with the Office of Gas Regulation (Ofgas) to form Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem) 
 
6  Cited in MacKerron and Watson (1996, p. 186). 
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Shortly prior to privatisation, 12 regional electricity companies (RECs) replaced the 12 
area boards and transmission became the responsibility of the National Grid Company 
(NGC), a company fully owned by the RECs. Each REC owned and operated the 
distribution network in its authorized area. At privatization each REC had a supply 
(retailing) business engaged in the bulk purchase of electricity and sale to customers and 
mostly consists of metering, billing and contract management. The distribution business 
of the RECs was and is significantly more capital-intensive than the supply business. 
Distribution and supply businesses were uncoupled to some extent (accounting 
separation was required) and the RECs were defined as Public Electricity Suppliers 
(PESs) that could supply electricity outside their franchise area over other distributions 
networks for a regulated access charge. In 1999, the distribution and supply activities 
were legally separated and the Utilities Act of 2000 replaced the PESs with licensed 
distribution network operators (DNOs). 
 
Following the privatization, initially, the main focus of the reform was on implementing 
competition in the wholesale electricity market which had proved more complex than 
anticipated. In England and Wales this involved separation of nuclear generation from 
fossil generation and the creation of two large fossil fuel generators. This created 
insufficient competition. A more competitive market was eventually achieved through 
further asset divestiture and new entry.7 The natural monopoly transmission and 
distribution networks had to be regulated. Although the network charges account for 
about 30% of end-use electricity prices, the potential for efficiency gains in the 
networks was targeted later. Initially, the large profits made by the new private owners 
brought the importance of network regulation model into public focus. However, 
regulation was gradually tightened and performance and distribution of efficiency gains 
improved. 
 
Ofgem has tight restrictions to ensure that each regional monopoly distribution business 
is held in a separate corporate entity, ring-fenced from all other activities carried on 
within the licensee’s group. This ring-fencing arrangement is to protect capital providers 
as well as consumers. Additionally, companies are required to pass some of the benefits 
from mergers or acquisitions over to consumers immediately following the merger 
(Ofgem, 1999c). 
 
There have also been significant changes in the way that DNOs structure their business 
and the range of activities in which they are involved. For example, several have active 
second-tier supply businesses and most are active in the supply of gas as well as 
7 See Newbery (1999) and Helm (2003) for detailed discussion of introducing competition in the 
wholesale electricity generation and retail markets in the UK. 
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electricity. This provides opportunities for joint marketing of the two fuels. At the 
beginning of 2007 two DNOs were in different ownership from their former supply 
businesses. Following a series of significant mergers the distribution businesses of the 
14 original RECs are currently owned by 7 independent companies. 
 
 
3.3 The performance under distribution price control reviews 
 
According to Henney (1994), by 1994, the majority of customers had seen no price 
benefit from the privatisation of the electricity supply industry. Small domestic and 
commercial customers effectively financed the privatisation, while the largest customers 
lost the benefit of their special agreements. Only the medium-sized (1–5MW) maximum 
demand customers benefited as these were able to purchase cheaper electricity from the 
generators. Additionally, domestic prices initially increased, relative to industrial prices, 
by about 5 per cent more than expected, with the increase being concentrated in the 
early years of the reform (Yarrow, 1992). By that time, it was also becoming evident 
that a tougher regulation of access charges of the natural monopoly distribution utilities 
was necessary as a means of reducing final prices. 
 
Henney (1994) explains the rise in prices and profits after privatisation as a regulatory 
failure, in terms of the lax setting of the initial price control. Also, the government did 
not factor in the potential productivity gains at the time of restructuring. Moreover, the 
scope for higher gearing was not anticipated. According to Domah and Pollitt (2001), 
RECs’ total costs declined over the period 1985–86 to 1988–89 by an average of 0.8 per 
cent p.a., while net controllable costs declined at a rate of 0.3 per cent p.a. 
 
There is general agreement that the first price control period for 1990/91-1994/95 
underestimated the potential for efficiency improvement. The price controls during this 
period were set prior to privatisation and hence were designed to make the sale of the 
assets a success, not to pass on predicted efficiency improvements to consumers. 
However, the evidence suggests that this was corrected by successive, increasingly 
challenging, incentive-based regulation and price control reviews. 
 
The second and third price control reviews for 1995/96-1999/00 and for 2000/01-
2004/05 periods respectively significantly reduced real distribution charges and there is 
ample evidence that they succeeded in achieving significant efficiency improvements 
and delivering the gains to customers. Domah and Pollitt (2001) find that labour 
productivity of the RECs nearly doubled between 1990-91 and 1997–98. Similarly, de 
Oliveira and Tolmasquim (2004) show that the customer per employee number ratio of 
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the RECs increased from 309 in 1990/91 to 681 in 1999/00. Figure 1 shows the path of 
overall retail and industrial electricity prices (including generation costs). 
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Figure 1: Electricity price developments 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 
 
Table 1 shows that, in the UK, between 1991/92 and 1998/99 savings to residential 
customers from reduction in distribution and transmission charges have been 9 percent. 
During the same period, price reductions originating from competitive generation 
market have been 10 percent although this can largely be attributed to reduction in the 
cost of fuel. 
 
Source % 
Lower generation costs (mainly fuel) 10 
Lower distribution and transmission charges 9 
Lower supply business margin 1 
Lower fossil fuel levy* 9 
Total 29 
* The fossil fuel levy was introduced to limit the effect of reform of the sector on coal 
industry. The levy was gradually phased out. Price reduction due to lower levy can therefore 
not be attributed to the effect of reform on prices. 
Table 1: Sources of price reduction to domestic users 1991/92-1998/99 
Source: Littlechild (2000) 
 
Figures 2-5 show the development of average distribution charges in real terms for 
residential and non-residential customers over time. As shown in Figure 2, residential 
customers with unrestricted charges have benefited from reductions both in their unit 
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and fixed charges. The relative reductions are in particular stronger in the fixed charges. 
Similarly, residential customers on Economy 7 schemes with separate peak and off-
peak unit charges have seen significant reductions in these as well as their fixed charges 
(Figure 3). The patterns in distribution access charging reductions are consistent with 
the increasing degree of toughness of the three five-year distribution price control 
reviews to be discussed in later sections. 
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Figure 2: Domestic unrestricted access charges (2005/06 prices) 
Source: Ofgem 
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Figure 3: Domestic Economy 7 charges (2005/06 prices) 
Source: Ofgem 
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For non-residential customers, consisting of commercial and industrial users, the time-
series are somewhat shorter and refer to the more recent 1998/99-2005/06 period. As 
shown in Figures 4 and 5, during this period, these customers have seen some 
reductions in their unit charges. The fixed charges, however, show a decline in initial 
years and then tend to rise towards the end of the period to stay slightly below the 
1998/99 levels. 
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Figure 4: Non-domestic unrestricted charges (2005/06 prices) 
Source: Ofgem 
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Figure 5: Non-domestic Economy 7 charges (2005/06 prices) 
Source: Ofgem 
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The distribution price control reviews have also improved the relative position of the 
UK distribution charges and end-user prices among the member countries in the EU. As 
shown in Table 2, following the efficiency gains and stricter price control reviews since 
1995, the UK network (distribution and transmission) access charges are now among 
the lowest in the EU. Moreover, the reduction in distribution charges has also 
contributed to an increase in affordability of end-user prices. As a result, the share of 
income spent on electricity by low-income consumers in the UK is also among the 
lowest in the EU (see European Commission, 2005). 
 
 Number of 
regulated 
transmission 
companies 
Number of 
regulated 
distribution 
companies 
Approximate 
network 
tariff – large 
users 
(€/KWh) 
Approximate 
network tariff 
– low voltage 
commercial 
(€/KWh) 
Approximate 
network tariff 
– low voltage 
household 
(€/KWh) 
Austria 3 133 0 51 53 
Belgium 1 26 11 - 51 
Denmark 10 120 19 25 48 
Finland 1 91 10 26 37 
France 1 161 12 40 48 
Germany 4 950 9 53 62 
Greece 1 1 8 - - 
Ireland 1 1 - 48 50 
Italy 1 173 9 41 67 
Luxembourg 2 10 7 62 72 
Netherlands 1 12 - - 40 
Portugal 3 13 4 39 37 
Spain 1 308 69 34 33 
Sweden 1 184 10 17 40 
UK 3 17 5-12 11-23 17-34 
Norway 1 170 11 25 - 
Estonia 1 42 11 31 40 
Latvia 1 8 - - - 
Lithuania 1 2 6 23 42 
Poland 1 14 13-26 48-88 37-50 
Czech Rep 1 327 3 - 36 
Slovakia 1 3 6 17 37 
Hungary 1 6 2 48 30 
Slovenia 1 5 8 38 31 
Cyprus 0 1 - - - 
Malta 0 1 - - - 
1. General: data excludes levies related to, for example PSOs and renewables or CHP promotion. 
2. Germany: the category Ib is not typical of commercial customers of this size (annual load 1000 hours) 
3. In Italy there are 10 companies owning a share of the national transmission network. 
Table 2: Distribution and transmission access charges (excluding charges and levies) 
Source: European Commission (2005) 
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3.4 Assessments of the impact of reform 
 
3.4.1 Efficiency and productivity studies 
 
There are a number of efficiency and productivity studies which illustrate the 
performance of the UK RECs immediately before and after privatisation. Pollitt (1995) 
reports a comparative study of 136 US and 9 UK distribution utilities using 1990 data 
and finds the relative performance of UK utilities comparable to those of the US. Burns 
and Weyman-Jones (1994) apply mathematical programming techniques to measure the 
change in the performance of the RECs between 1973 and 1993. The study finds that 
the initial post-privatisation productivity growth is a continuation of the pre-
privatisation trend indicating the effect of a lax initial price control review. Moreover, 
the results indicate an increase in performance diversity among the RECs after 
privatisation. Also, Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) use an econometric cost function 
to examine the efficiency of the RECs between 1980 and 1992. The results show 
evidence of improved cost efficiency in the years following the 1990 privatisation of the 
RECs. 
 
Hattori, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005) examined the efficiency of the UK and Japanese 
distribution companies between 1985 and 1998 using data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) techniques. The DEA results indicate that 
following the reform, the efficiency differences among the UK firms increased. The 
results of Malmquist productivity index show a decline in productivity prior to the 
reform between 1985/86 and 1989/90. 
 
Moreover, during the first price control review for the 1990/91-1994/95 period the 
annual productivity index for all RECs grew by an annual average of 1.2 percent. This 
was then followed by an annual average increase in productivity index of 10.7 between 
1995/96 an 1997/98. The sharp increase in efficiency for this period has been attributed 
to the tougher second distribution price controls enforced for the 1995/96-1999/00 
period. 
 
Giannakis, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005) re-examine the productivity of the UK RECs 
between 1991/92 and 1998/99. The study finds variations between the operating 
expenditure (Opex) and total expenditure (Totex) performance of the companies 
indicating scope for trade-off between operating and capital expenditures (Capex). In 
addition, the Malmquist productivity index results show significant improvement during 
the period of study. 
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3.4.2 Cost-benefit analysis of the reform 
 
While efficiency and productivity analysis can be used to measure the efficiency effects 
of reforms on the sector, the overall economic efficiency resulting from reforms can 
best be examined by social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). Domah and Pollitt (2001) 
provide a detailed social cost-benefit analysis of the effect of reform on the UK 
distribution companies. The study finds that per unit revenue of the distribution and 
supply businesses rose with an average of 22 percent above the preprivatisation-period 
level during the first price control period. During the second price control, the unit costs 
of the RECs fell 20 percent between 1994 and 1998. Also, labour productivity nearly 
doubled in 1997–98 over the 1990–91 level. 
 
In addition, the study estimates the cost of restructuring and privatisation (at 1995 
prices) at about to £1.1 billion at a 6 per cent discount rate. This cost reduces the 
benefits of restructuring and privatising the distribution and supply businesses of the 
RECs. Based on the experience of electricity supply industries in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland and of Nuclear Electric, and the performance of the area boards during the 
period 1979 to 1989, the study predicts that unit costs might have fallen by 2 per cent 
p.a. if privatization had not occurred. Comparing this counterfactual scenario with what 
actually happened the study predicts net efficiency gains from privatisation, which 
started accruing to consumers after 1999, will amount to about £6.1 billion. The net 
efficiency gains of the RECs are, however, very sensitive to the discount rate used, 
mainly due to the skewness in the distribution of these gains. 
 
The Domah and Pollitt (2001) study identified how the net benefits were shared among 
consumers, government and producers in society. Of the total net benefit of £6.1bn in 
the base case consumers are expected to gain £1.1 billion (at 2 per cent counterfactual 
cost fall and 6 per cent discount rate) relative to continued public ownership of the 
RECs. With the special NGC rebates of 1995–96, the total benefits to consumers 
amounted to £2 billion; however, consumers lose at a 10 per cent discount rate. 
However, these benefits to customers were derived from predictions of future price 
falls, which began in 2000. By 1998, consumers had lost considerably from 
privatisation of the RECs. The government have gained £9 billion from privatization 
proceeds (£8.2 billion) and windfall taxes (£1.3 billion) which after loss of flow 
dividend/tax revenue would give a net benefit of about £5.0 billion from the 
restructuring and privatisation of the RECs. 
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4. Distribution Price Controls 
 
4.1 The first distribution price control period 
 
The initial distribution price controls on the RECs were put in place by the government 
and executed by the Department of Energy at the time of restructuring, and permitted 
price increases that ranged up to 2.5 percentage points above the inflation rate (OFFER, 
1994). Responsibility for future price controls was placed under an independent 
regulatory body, initially called OFFER and later Ofgem. Price controls on the RECs’ 
supply businesses only allowed price rises limited to no more than inflation during the 
period 1990/91 to 1994/95. 
 
The leniency on the companies may be linked to the desire by the government to 
facilitate the sale of the assets by guaranteeing high prices for a fixed period. Indeed, the 
government did not consult the regulator on the terms of the first price control. Also, the 
government seems to have been unaware of the scale of potential for efficiency 
improvement in these companies. The companies showed high share prices well beyond 
their floatation values and paid increasing dividends to their shareholders. 
 
It should be noted that the initial problems associated with implementing the reform 
were not limited to the regulation of distribution networks in the first price control 
period. During the same period, the ineffective structure and competition in wholesale 
market also led to large profits for the generators. Brower, Thomas, and Mitchell (1997) 
show that the profit to revenue ratio of the UK generators were in decline between 
1985/86 and 1989/90 and consistently lower than those of the US utilities (though this 
could be due to high costs as well as under-pricing). However, in 1990/91 the UK 
generators catch up with the US firms and increasingly widen their lead until 1994/95. 
 
 
4.2 Subsequent distribution price control reviews 
 
At the time of the second price control review (1995-00 period), the companies had 
shown significant potential for efficiency gain. The period 1990 to 1995 saw large 
increases in the profitability of the RECs, leading to large rises in their share prices. 
Moreover, the successful flotation of NGC jointly owned by the RECs in mid-1995 
indicated the undervaluation of the assets at privatisation. The windfall gains to 
shareholders of privatised utilities put the government under pressure. As a result, the 
RECs were obliged to make a one-off 50 pound payment to each of their customers. 
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Moreover, in 1997, a one-off wind-fall tax of £1.5 billion was imposed on the RECs 
payable in two instalments. 
 
As discussed, the first distribution price control review period (DPCR1) for the 
1990/91-1994/95 period set by the Department of Energy was generous to the 
companies. In August 1994, for the second distribution price control review (DPCR2) 
for the 1995/96-1999/00, OFFER introduced reductions averaging 14 percent in final 
electricity prices to take effect in April 1995, requiring price cuts in real terms of 11–17 
percent in distribution charges in 1995/96. Distribution charges were, thereafter, 
required to fall by an X-factor of 2 percent per year in real terms for the duration of the 
price control review. However, a high takeover bid for Northern company shortly after 
the announcement of the price controls indicated that the utilities still had significant 
potential for cost savings. The event triggered a revision of the 1995/96-1999/00 price 
control which resulted in further reductions in real terms of between 10 and 13 percent 
in 1996/97 and increasing the X-factor to 3 percent. In addition, the price controls were 
modified in 1998 to allow RECs to make additional charges to facilitate competition in 
supply. 
 
The third price control review (DPCR3) for 2000/01-2004/05 introduced further cuts on 
distribution businesses averaging 3 per cent for the next five years, with an initial cut in 
RECs’ distribution revenue by about 23.4 per cent (though some of the initial cut 
represented a transfer of costs to the legally separate supply businesses). This amounted 
to an overall initial revenue cut of £503 million at 1995 prices (Ofgem, 1999a). Table 4 
summarizes the rate reductions under distribution and supply price control reviews. 
 
Period Rate of price (cost) decrease 
1990–91 to 1994–95  
 
Variable up to 2.5% above the inflation rate 
1995 to 1995–96  
 
11–17% (average of 14%) 
1996 to 1996–97  
 
10–13% 
1997 to April 2000 
 
Average of 3% p.a. 
2000 to 2004–05 
 
One-off cut in distribution revenue by 23.4% in 2000–01; 
then a 3% p.a. fall in unit revenue until 2005 
Table 4: Summary of distribution price controls for RECs in England and Wales 
Source: Domah and Pollitt (2001) 
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4.3 Ofgem’s distribution price control review 2005/06-2009/108
 
The basic characteristics of Ofgem’s approach to distribution price control can be stated 
as follows. An initial consultation document is issued around 18 months before the end 
of the current price control period. This document discusses the timetable and issues for 
consideration in the upcoming control period. This is followed by several subsequent 
documents. At each stage responses are invited from interested parties and these are 
publicly available in the Ofgem library unless marked confidential. A ‘Final Proposals’ 
document is issued within six months of the end of the price control with details of the 
X factors which Ofgem proposes to apply to each company from the beginning of the 
next control period. Companies have one month to decide to appeal to the competition 
authority, the Competition Commission (formerly the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission) if they are unwilling to accept the proposed price control. An appeal on 
distribution prices has happened once so far when Scottish Hydro-Electric did not 
accept its final distribution and supply price controls proposed by the regulator for 
1995-2000.9
 
The incentive regulation model of distribution networks in Britain consists of a hybrid 
of incentive schemes. Under the current arrangements, the operating expenditure, 
capital spending, and quality of service (including network energy losses) are 
incentivised separately and under different types of schemes within a building block 
framework. 
 
The utilities’ controllable operating expenditures (Opex) are incentivised by 
benchmarking these against an efficient frontier made up of the best practice DNOs in 
the sector. The allowed Opex of individual DNOs is set such that it requires them to 
close a specific proportion of their performance gap relative to the frontier during the 
price control period. In addition, all DNOs are given a general technical efficiency 
improvement target that is common to all DNOs. 
 
In the latest two distribution price control reviews, Ofgem have used a relatively simple 
regression methodology where they obtain an adjusted measure of operating costs for 
each company and plot this against a measure of their composite output. They have then 
carried out an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of operating costs against 
output. Finally, they have shifted this line downwards, based on the technique of 
8 This section draws significantly on Pollitt (2005). 
9 See MMC (1995). Ofgem’s jurisdiction covers Great Britain only not Northern Ireland. Electricity and 
gas in Northern Ireland is regulated by Ofreg. Northern Ireland Electricity appealed against Ofreg’s 
distribution price control for the period 1997-2002 (see MMC, 1997). 
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corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), to obtain a frontier line against which 
inefficient firms are compared (Figure 6). In 2004 (and 1999) the data used for the 
regression analysis were for a single year (2004: 2002-2003 and 1999:1997-1998) for 
the 14 companies. In Figure 6, the efficiency score of firm B is given by the ratio: 
EF/BF. This represents the extent to which actual costs could be reduced while still 
keeping firm B on the efficient frontier. 
 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of the COLS method 
 
In the next stage, the regulatory asset base (RAB) for each DNO is determined, on 
which they are entitled to earn an allowed rate of return. While the existing assets in the 
RAB are gradually depreciated, in the long run, their stock of capital will increasingly 
consist of new capital investments. The initial RAB (used from the second price control 
period) in the case of the RECs was based on their market capitalisation at privatisation. 
The rate of return is set based on a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) measure 
which uses a specific reference debt and equity split, reference market rate of return and 
debt interest rate and a relevant equity beta. Firms are free to choose their own actual 
level of gearing. The pre-tax rate of return in the latest price control has been set at 6.9 
percent. 
 
New capital investments are increasingly driving the regulated revenue of DNOs, as 
operating expenditures fall and new investments are added to a growing regulatory asset 
base. The process for assessing the required level of capital expenditure over a price 
control period is as follows. Utilities must draft business plans which include projected 
capital expenditure. These are then audited by a firm of engineering consultants, 
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working for Ofgem. Usually these consultants recommend lower levels of capital 
expenditure than that proposed by each utility. This gives a base level of required 
capital expenditure to which an incentive scheme is applied. The incentive scheme 
resembles a menu of contracts regulation model. The menu of contracts approach is 
appealing at the presence of strong information asymmetry. However, this approach is 
not widely used in practice with the main difficulty being development of a set of 
suitable menu of options. 
 
The allowed Opex and Capex of the utilities together with their regulatory asset base 
form the basis of the calculation of the utilities’ total allowed revenues. The allowed 
revenues are in turn the basis for determination of the utilities’ X-factors and initial 
prices applicable to their tariffs for the duration of the price control period. Figure 7 
shows a simple illustration of setting the X-factors and allowed revenue. DNOs are 
allowed to recover their capital costs (weighted average cost of capital * regulatory 
asset base), depreciation costs, and operating expenditures. The utilities’ actual revenue 
should reach the efficient level of allowed revenue by the end of the price control 
period. This can be achieved by an infinite number of combinations of a price reduction 
in the first year and subsequent reduction through X-factors. Traditionally, Ofgem have 
opted for an immediate and differentiated reduction in initial prices combined with 
equal X-factors for all DNOs. This means that customers can benefit from the expected 
efficiency gains immediately and expect more moderate reductions in subsequent years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2005 2010
WACC x RAB
Depreciation
Eff. Opex
X factor
Figure 7: Opex benchmarking and determination of allowed revenues and X-factors 
 
 
 
Allowed Revenue
Frontier Shift
Actual Opex
X factor
Actual Revenue 2005
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Quality of service and network energy losses are incentivised separately through 
performance targets. The targets for each DNO are individual and deviation from these 
results in company specific penalties and rewards calculated based on an elaborate 
system. The reward and penalty affect the total allowed revenue. In order to avoid 
jeopardizing financial viability of the companies, the maximum amount subject to 
quality of service reward and penalty scheme is capped as a percentage of allowed 
revenue. Collectively, these incentive schemes amount to a revenue cap incentive 
regulation. 
 
Due to the presence of trade-offs between Opex, Capex, quality of service, and network 
losses, from an economic efficiency point of view, it is preferable to use an integrated 
benchmarking model. Such a model would be based on a single total expenditure 
(Totex) measure where all cost measures as well as some measure of monetary values of 
service quality and network losses are added together. The hybrid system in Britain is 
contrary to the notion of integrated overall incentive regulation. However, the adopted 
approach – segmented regulation - gives more control to the regulator to address 
specific areas of focus. It also involves less complicated modelling than would a fully 
integrated benchmarking model and is more transparent in its operation. At the same 
time, the current incentive system does not reflect the potential trade-off between the 
specific regulated aspects of the utilities. 
 
 
5. Some Issues in Regulation Benchmarking 
 
In this section we discuss some of the issues with which incentive regulation has to 
deal. Each of these issues has been faced by Offer/Ofgem in the UK. We examine issues 
to do with identifying the right X-factor, incentivisation of quality of supply, network 
losses and new investments. Each of which poses particular challenges within the price 
review process. 
 
 
5.1 Setting the right benchmark 
 
The appeal of benchmarking as a practical approach to operationalize the concept of 
incentive regulation is evident. In particular, benchmarking has the potential to reduce 
information asymmetry between the regulator and the firm. 
 
However, the information requirement for conducting a robust benchmarking exercise 
has proved to be more complicated than expected. Establishing the appropriate reporting 
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formats, standardisation of data, and ensuring the quality of data have been non-trivial. 
Moreover, the legal aspects surrounding the collection of the required data and the use 
of benchmarking have caused delays and complicated some regulatory proceedings. 
 
A major reservation against assigning firm specific X-factors has been that the cost 
saving incentives can be blunted if companies are not allowed to retain efficiency 
savings beyond the next price review. Benchmarking may result in firms having to run 
to stand still and hence there may be strong incentives to subvert the regulatory process. 
 
Frontier approaches are also susceptible to shocks and errors in data. This is especially 
the case when cross-sectional data is used and there is no allowance for errors. In order 
to minimise problems due to data errors there should be very careful handling of data 
accuracy. Recognising the importance of data quality in benchmarking, the Norwegian 
and UK regulators have made considerable efforts to improve data standardisation and 
accuracy. 
 
Determining the future rate of movement of the frontier is problematic. Measures of 
past productivity growth usually include both frontier shift effects and movements 
towards the frontier. However, the problem can be reduced if firms are compared to 
world best practice as the variation in world best practice frontier shifts (given 
international benchmarking) is small (1-2% p.a.). Once efficiency scores are calculated, 
the crucial assumption in deciding the X-factors is the rate at which the efficiency gaps 
can be closed. The regulators will need to make allowance both for this and for in-
country heterogeneity. 
 
The issue of the scope for the use of benchmarking in incentive regulation has been 
important. For example, separate analysis of capital costs and operating expenses can 
encourage intermediation between these cost categories. Firms may attempt to seek 
higher capital expenditure to reduce operating costs. While, in principle, benchmarking 
should ideally apply to total costs, this is difficult given the heterogeneous nature of 
capital (which could simply be a function of differing accounting standards). As a 
result, regulators in leading countries such as the UK and Norway have made 
considerable effort to handle the possibility of intermediation. International 
comparisons are often restricted to comparison of operating costs because of the 
heterogeneity of capital but this may limit their applicability. 
 
Moreover, strategic behaviour or gaming by firms within the regulatory process is a 
longstanding regulatory issue as the regulator is dependent, to a degree, on information 
supplied by the firms. However, although benchmarking may not prevent gaming 
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entirely it could relate to it (see Jamasb, Nillesen, and Pollitt, 2003, 2004). Di Tella and 
Dyck (2002) examine the strategic behaviour associated with price-cap regulation of 
electricity distribution utilities in Chile. The findings indicate a downward cost trend, 
but one year in four the cost was about 1.4 percent above trend. These cost reversals 
occurred in the year preceding a price review. The cost increase appears to lead to 
higher returns for stock prices of the firms. The study suggests that this represents a 
perverse incentive in the regulation model, as cost reversal in the year of price 
determination leads to higher prices in the following control period. 
 
Furthermore, in many cases, though mostly in developing countries, lack of regulatory 
experience and inadequate implementation of incentive regulation models have led to 
major contract renegotiations (Benavides and Fainboim, 1999; Abdala, 2001; Basañes 
et al., 1999). Guasch (2003, 2004) finds that contract renegotiations after the award of 
infrastructure concessions have been significantly more likely for concessions under 
price cap than for rate of return regulation models. Renegotiations often reduced the 
incentive property of the regulation models by making them more similar to rate of 
return regulation. In addition, the achieved efficiency gains were often not passed to 
consumers and instead benefited the companies or the government (Estache et al., 
2003). Maintaining the incentive property of the UK price cap regulation can gradually 
become difficult as the share of benchmarked costs declines (Thomas, 2004). 
 
 
5.2 Quality of Service 
 
The social and economic costs of supply interruptions are substantial.10 At the same 
time, introduction of incentive regulation has brought to attention the issue of the trade-
offs between costs and non-tradable outputs or attributes of the utilities. In particular, 
regulators are concerned with the trade-offs between capital and operating costs on the 
one hand and service quality on the other. Incentive regulation tends to narrow down the 
focus of the utilities on those aspects of their operation that are incentivised by the 
scheme. Under the prevalent incentive regulation schemes, utilities face strong 
incentives to undertake cost savings. Therefore, in the absence of specific regulation 
quality of service is likely to deteriorate.11
 
Improving quality of service involves operating and capital costs for the utilities. 
However, the companies have better information about their ability to improve quality 
10 This section draws significantly from Giannakis, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005). 
11 It should be noted that quality of electricity services can be affected at generation, transmission, and 
distribution stages of the system. 
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and the associated costs than the regulator. At the same time, the socio-economic cost or 
customer valuation of quality is difficult to measure. From a pure economic point of 
view, the optimum is where the marginal cost of improving quality is equal to the socio-
economic value of quality improvement. In the absence of proper incentives to achieve 
optimal quality, it is very unlikely that a regulated utility will be offering optimal 
quality. Either the incentives to improve quality will be too low and there will be under-
performance or the regulatory process will have allowed expensive quality investments 
which push the level of quality above the optimal level. 
 
A survey of the literature in Sappington (2005) concludes that there are no simple 
policy solutions for effective regulation of quality of service but they depend on the 
information available to the regulator, institutional settings, and consumer preferences. 
The paper argues in favour of providing the regulated firm with proper reward and 
penalty incentives for service quality when the regulator has sufficient information on 
consumer preferences and production technologies. 
 
The concern surrounding the impacts of incentive regulation on service quality has been 
recognised ever since price cap regulation was first implemented as part of the British 
telecommunication industry restructuring (Waddams Price et al., 2002). However, the 
strong focus of regulators on incentivising quality is of more recent date as reforms 
progressively evolve beyond pure cost efficiency considerations to encompass non-
marketable aspects of the distribution networks. 
 
Tangerås (2003) argues that, when quantity is regulated, yardstick competition results in 
lower quality than under individual regulation although under individual regulation, the 
quality would be too high. In principle, the above argument also holds for revenue and 
price cap regulation models. Evidence shows that utilities respond to explicit service 
quality incentives and strong regulation can prevent deterioration of quality. For 
example, evidence from the UK and Norway shows that, although their approaches to 
regulation differ, utilities have responded to quality of service incentives. Also, Ter-
Martirosyan (2003), in a study of performance based regulation of the US electric 
utilities finds that, in the absence of explicit regulation, quality of service tends to 
decline. At the same time, the individual non-incentivised reliability indicators do not 
necessarily improve (CPB, 2004). This indicates both the power of incentives and the 
importance of defining the appropriate indicators. 
 
There are different approaches for providing quality incentives to distribution utilities: 
(i) marginal rewards and penalties, (ii) absolute fines, and (iii) quality-incorporated 
benchmarking (Frontier Economics, 2003). The marginal reward and penalty scheme is 
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based on reward or penalty per unit of quality improvements (degradation) that reflect 
marginal value of quality to customers. In equilibrium, a profit-maximising firm will 
operate at an efficient level according to its individual marginal cost curve. These 
mechanisms are referred to as “decentralised”, as they allow firms to choose their level 
of quality provision. 
 
Absolute fines are centralised and require the company to pay a specified amount if 
quality drops below a threshold. Although absolute schemes are economically inferior 
to marginal ones, they entail broader social and political benefits by ensuring that 
customers are protected by performance standards. Regulators can also use a 
combination of marginal and absolute incentives. Quality-incorporated benchmarking is 
also based on marginal rewards and penalties. For example, under price cap regulation, 
a company that improves quality may be allowed to raise its price by an amount that 
reflects the social value of the increased quality. Similar to marginal reward and penalty 
schemes, these methods are decentralised, thus minimising the need for regulatory 
intervention. The challenge associated with incorporating service quality in 
benchmarking is to balance the cost and quality-oriented incentives. 
 
Moreover, cost-quality benchmarking introduces the dynamic benefits of competition 
into the provision of service quality. In effect, by using benchmarking, regulated firms 
compete to deliver an optimal bundle of cost and service quality. Thus, in addition to 
static gain maximisation (achieved by adjusting the quality level subject to a fixed cost 
curve), firms also face an incentive to pursue long-term investments that shift quality 
provision costs downwards. 
 
In designing quality-incorporated regulatory mechanisms, regulators are faced with the 
task of determining a market demand curve for service quality. Lack of detailed and 
accurate data is also a common problem. For instance, the Norwegian regulator 
estimates interruption costs at an aggregate level, where customers are classified as 
being either residential/agricultural or industrial/commercial (Langset et al., 2001). 
Service quality regulation also involves a political aspect that can come into conflict 
with economic considerations. Customers’s valuation of quality may differ between 
distribution companies. This would imply that individually tailored service qualities are 
the efficient outcome. However this may be politically unacceptable if poorer regions 
ended up with worse levels of quality. 
 
At the same time, regulators have not yet explicitly integrated quality of service in their 
benchmarking exercise. A notable exception is, however, Norway which introduced 
quality-dependent revenue caps in 2001 (Heggset et al., 2001; Langset et al., 2001). 
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5.2.1 Quality of service in the UK under incentive regulation 
 
Conceptually, inclusion of service quality in an overall efficiency benchmarking of 
utilities has clear incentive advantages and this has been advocated in other studies (see 
e.g. Giannakis, et al., 2005; Ajodhia and Hakvoort, 2005). In Norway, such an approach 
has been used in the 2002-2007 distribution price control and is also expected to be used 
for the next price control. Giannakis, et al. (2005) report a benchmarking study of the 
UK distribution companies between 1990/91 and 1998/99. The study finds significant 
changes in the rankings of the companies when benchmarked in terms of operating cost, 
total cost, quality-only, and combined cost-quality models (Figure 7). The results 
indicate that there are potential trade-offs between cost (operating and capital) and 
quality and that partial cost benchmarking does not sufficiently capture the service 
quality dimension. 
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Figure 7: Average annual company rankings from Models Opex, Totex, Quality and 
Totex-Quality (1 is best, 14 is worst) 1991/92-1998/99 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, from an economic efficiency point of view, due to 
presence of trade-offs between Opex, Capex, service quality, and losses, it is preferable 
to use an integrated approach to benchmarking. Such an approach could, for example, 
be based on obtaining a monetary value such as willingness to pay (WTP) for well-
defined measures of quality and adding the cost of (expected) service interruptions to 
the utilities’ total costs. To the extent the utilities can improve their actual quality of 
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service performance they can retain the difference between the actual and expected cost 
of interruptions. Hence, the utilities will have incentive to improve service quality up to 
the point where the cost of doing so equals the WTP value of quality. 
 
The current regulatory arrangements in the UK treat Opex, Capex and service quality 
separately. This may provide firms with distorted incentives that lead them to adopt an 
inefficient output mix. Under the current regulatory regime, a firm receives greater 
benefits from saving Opex than by an equal amount of Capex reduction (Ofgem, 
2003a). Thus, firms may seek to capitalise Opex to obtain higher efficiency score and 
allowed revenue. Unless utilities face incentives that reflect the social value of service 
quality, they are unlikely to provide socially optimal levels of quality. 
 
A further issue is related to the periodicity of the price reviews. Under the present 
scheme, companies retain 27% of the present value of a cost reduction made in the first 
year of a review period but only 6% of the present value of an equal cost saving made in 
the final year (Ofgem, 2003a). Thus, companies may delay efficiency improvements 
and/or adopt distorted capital investment programmes. Such distortions of incentives 
exist for quality enhancing investments, where the quality benchmarks are reset every 
five years. This means that any benefits of investments may not be retained beyond the 
current distribution price review period. 
 
Between 1990 and 2000, quality of service in Great Britain was regulated through 
guaranteed standards of performance, which entitle consumers to compensation if the 
firms breach them, and overall standards, which refer to system-level performance. 
Originally, 10 guaranteed standards were applied and a further one was introduced in 
1998. Overall standards were also set for each firm. The regulator has progressively 
tightened the standards and consultations with DNOs and other stakeholders have been 
carried out. However, there is no direct evidence with regards to the effectiveness of the 
reward and penalty schemes (Waddams Price et al., 2002). However for the current 
price control period (2005-2010) considerable improvements in quality are expected. 
 
The third price control review set company-specific quality standards for 2004/05 on 
the basis of their historic performance (Ofgem, 1999a). The regulator and the companies 
generally supported the introduction of an incentive-based regime for service quality 
regulation (Ofgem, 1999b). However, since the necessary foundation work had not been 
carried out, it was proposed that the incentive mechanisms should be developed as part 
of a work programme, the Information and Incentives Project (IIP), and applied from 
2002/03, rather than the start of the price control period (2000/01). 
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The progress of the IIP illustrates some of the challenges involved in setting up 
incentives for quality of service. The IIP was divided into two main parts. The first part, 
culminated in September 2000, defined output measures for service quality, set 
guidelines for improving measurement accuracy, and constructed a framework for 
reporting and monitoring. Regarding measurement accuracy, it was estimated that the 
quality measurements conducted by DNOs involved errors of up to 30% in some quality 
measure (Ofgem, 2000). 
 
Although inaccuracies in data may have some effect on the level of efficiency measured 
for the firms, the rates of change are less likely to be affected. Data from recent years 
are more accurate as Ofgem requested the DNOs to install measurement systems with 
95% accuracy by April 2002 and an independent auditor was appointed to examine 
measurement issues. It is noteworthy that Ofgem has expanded considerable effort to 
harmonise the data on service quality which have subsequently been utilised to devise 
reward and penalty schemes for the companies in relation to performance standards. 
 
The second part of the IIP, focused on incentive regulation schemes for quality of 
service. The current scheme, which came into operation in April 2002, links the quality 
of service performance of DNOs to their allowed revenue. The arrangements consists of 
mechanisms that (i) penalise utilities for not meeting their targets, (ii) reward utilities 
that exceed targets, and (iii) reward frontier performance by guaranteeing less strict 
standards for the next control period (Ofgem, 2001). In order to mitigate regulatory risk, 
the exposure of the firms has been limited to up to 4% of their revenue (see next sub-
section for more details). In practice, the IIP’s scheme is similar to the marginal 
penalties (rewards) scheme, with the addition of a payment cap. However, it is unlikely 
that these marginal incentives are calibrated such that they reflect the full social value of 
quality (Frontier Economics, 2003). 
 
In the UK, for the purposes of regulation, the main measures of quality of service in 
distribution networks, in terms of revenue exposure, are supply interruptions per 100 
customers (availability of service) and number of minutes lost per connected customer 
(reliability of service). Figure 8 shows that, in the post-reform period, the number of 
interruptions in the UK distribution networks has gradually decreased. The figure 
indicates a marked decline in interruptions during the second price control review 
period. During the third price control review period, the interruptions initially show 
some increase and then decline at the end of the price control period. 
 
Figure 9 shows the number of minutes lost per connected customer for the same period. 
As shown in the figure, during the three price control reviews, the reliability of service 
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has also generally improved. Overall the trends in quality of service measures indicate 
improvements under incentive regulation. It should be noted that some variations from 
one year to another can be caused by measurement errors and weather conditions. 
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Figure 8: Average number of interruptions per 100 customers per year 
Source: Ofgem 
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For some DNOs substantial changes were made for accuracy as new measurement systems 
were introduced in the course of 2001/02  
Figure 9: Average number of minutes lost per connected customer per year 
Source: Ofgem 
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Inclusion of the cost of non-delivered energy based on WTP measurements can affect 
different utilities to rather different degrees. Figure 10 shows the calculated cost of 
energy non-supplied as percentage of revenue caps for 130 Norwegian distribution 
utilities in increasing order. As shown in the figure, it is possible that, at the extreme 
ends of the spectrum, some firms may be rewarded or penalised significantly by 
inclusion of the cost of non-delivered energy. At the initial price control periods, the 
regulator must be confident about the quality of data and particular circumstances of 
‘outlier’ firms and special cases that may give rise to large deviations from the main 
body of observations. 
 
 
Figure 10: The cost of energy not-supplied (ENS) as percentage of  
revenue cap for 130 Norwegian electricity distribution utilities 
Source: Dalen (2006) 
 
It is important to decide whether the WTP values used are uniform across the country 
and for all companies. There is reason to believe that this value can differ across the 
country and hence in different distribution service areas. To the extent that regional 
differences in WTP values are not reflected in the incentive scheme, the adaptation of 
utilities to socially efficient service quality levels can be distorted. A survey of WTP 
commissioned by the UK regulator Ofgem indicates that such valuation differences 
among different regions and consumer groups indeed exist (Ofgem, 2004a). At the same 
time, the overall WTP of networks for a given unit of quality also depends on the 
composition of their customers. For example, industrial customers generally assign a 
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higher value and opportunity cost to service quality than residential and commercial 
customers. 
 
Nevertheless, the potential political sensitivities of explicit use of differentiated service 
quality valuations are clear. However these sensitivities may be a particular feature of 
central government, local governments may be much freer to assign different quality 
valuations compared with their peers. It is important to note that the marginal cost curve 
of improving service quality varies across the companies. An implication of subjecting 
the firms to their marginal cost of quality improvements is that, in the long-run, this 
could result in differentiated service quality levels across the country. 
 
If there are substantial performance differences in term of quality of service, the share 
of quality incentives as their total allowed revenues can be substantial. The effect of the 
value of quality on total allowed revenues for some utilities may become stronger than 
those of the Norwegian utilities depicted in Figure 10. It is preferable to first aim at 
bringing the quality of service to comparable levels across the sector before integrating 
them with the companies’ own costs and incorporating them fully into the 
benchmarking model. 
 
For some firms with low quality performance, the transition to a high quality network 
may require large capital investments and time. In the UK, there is a 46 percent allowed 
increase in real capital investments in the 2005-2010 distribution price control period 
over the previous period that is partly intended to improve the quality of service during 
this period. Exempting investments from benchmarking offers some flexibility in 
addressing investment related priority targets. In contrast, it must be noted that, total 
cost benchmarking methods do not have built-in mechanisms that would signal 
increased investment in specific areas such as quality. In Norway, the regulator has 
incorporated the value of non-delivered energy to customers as a cost in the 
benchmarking model. The values are obtained from surveys and studies of different 
consumer groups. Both the UK and Norwegian benchmarking models, despite the 
differences in their approach, have succeeded in improving the quality of service. 
 
5.2.2 Quality of service incentives within UK price controls 
 
As noted, regulation pertaining to quality of service of DNOs has evolved gradually 
since the first distribution price control review. Quality of service in distribution 
networks is multi-faceted and extends beyond the number and length of service 
interruptions. Recognising this, the quality of service incentives in Ofgem’s price 
controls through revenue exposure consist of: (i) interruption (continuity of service) 
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incentives, (ii) guaranteed standards of performance, (iii) quality of telephone service, 
and (iv) a discretionary reward scheme. 
 
The fourth price control review has significantly increased the targets and provided 
stronger incentive to achieve these. Table 5 shows the revenue exposure of the DNOs to 
quality of service performance measures for the third (1995/99-2004/05) and fourth 
(2005/06-2009/10) price control reviews. The interruption incentives are supply 
interruptions per 100 customers (CI) and number of minutes lost per connected 
customer (CML). Individual CI and CML targets are set for the companies and 
performance is measured in relation to the targets. 
 
 
Incentive  
Arrangement 
 
Third Distribution 
Price Control Review 
2000/01-2004/05 
 
Fourth Distribution 
Price Control Review 
2000/01-2004/05 
 
Interruption incentive scheme: 
   - Duration of interruptions 
   - Number of interruptions 
 
+/-1.25% 
+/-0.5% 
 
+/-1.8% 
+/-1.2% 
Storm compensation 
arrangements 
-1% -2% 
Other standards of performance Uncapped Uncapped 
 
Quality of telephone response +/- 0.125% +0.05% to -0.25% 
 
Quality of telephone response in 
storm conditions 
+/- 0.125% 0 initially 
+/-0.25% for 3 years 
Discretionary reward scheme Not applicable  Up to + 1m pounds 
 
Overall cap/total +2% to -2.875% 4% on downside 
No overall cap on upside 
Table 5: Revenue exposure to quality of service 
Source: Ofgem (2004b) 
 
The guaranteed standards of performance cover 12 specific aspects of the service. While 
these incentives affect the companies’ regulated revenue, the standards of performance 
involve payment of compensation to individual customers under defined circumstances 
(Table 6). In principle, companies are indifferent as to whether they settle quality-
related payments by transacting with the government (through fines) or with consumers 
(through compensation or reduced prices). However, the latter option is politically more 
attractive as it compensates those who have experienced poor service quality (Waddams 
Price et al., 2002). 
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Repo
rting 
code 
Service Performance Level Penalty Payment 
GS1 
 
All DNOs to respond 
within 3 hours on a 
working day (at least) 7 
am to 7 pm, and within 
4 hours on other days 
between (at least) 9 am 
to 5 pm , otherwise a 
payment must be made 
Respond to failure of distributors fuse 
(Regulation 10) 
£20 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
 
GS2 Supply restoration: 
normal conditions 
(Regulation 5) 
 
Supply must be restored within 18 hours, 
otherwise a payment must be made 
 
£50 for domestic 
customers and £100 for 
non-domestic customers, 
plus £25 for each further 
12 hours 
GS2A* 
 
Supply restoration: 
multiple interruptions 
(Regulation 9) 
If four or more interruptions each lasting 3 or 
more hours occur in any single year (1 April – 
31 March) , a payment must be made 
£50 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
 
GS3 
 
Estimate of charges for 
connection (Regulation 
11) 
5 working days for simple work and 15 
working days for significant work, otherwise a 
payment must be made 
£40 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
GS4* 
 
Notice of planned 
interruption to supply 
(Regulation 12) 
Customers must be given at least 2 days 
notice, otherwise a payment must be made 
 
£20 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
GS5 
 
Investigation of voltage 
Complaints 
(Regulation 13) 
Visit customer’s premises within 7 
working days or dispatch an explanation of 
the probable reason for the complaint within 5 
working days, otherwise a payment must be 
made 
£20 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
 
GS8 
 
Making and keeping 
Appointments 
(Regulation 17) 
Companies must offer and keep a timed 
appointment, or offer and keep a timed 
appointment where requested by the customer, 
otherwise a payment must be made 
£20 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
 
GS9 
 
Payments owed under 
the standards 
(Regulation 19) 
Payment to be made within 10 working days, 
otherwise a payment must be made 
 
£20 for domestic and 
nondomestic customers 
GS11A
* 
 
Supply restoration: 
Category 1 severe 
weather conditions 
(Regulation 6) 
Supplies must be restored within 24 hours (see 
table 2.2 below), otherwise a payment must be 
made 
 
£25 for domestic and non 
domestic customers, plus 
£25 for each further 12 
hours up to a cap of £200 
per customer 
GS11B
* 
 
Supply restoration: 
Category 2 severe 
weather conditions 
(Regulation 6) 
Supplies must be restored within 48 hours, 
otherwise a payment must be made 
 
£25 for domestic and non 
domestic customers, plus 
£25 for each further 12 
hours up to a cap of £200 
per customer 
GS11C
* 
 
Supply restoration: 
Category 3 severe 
weather conditions 
(Regulation 6) 
Supplies must be restored within the 
period calculated using the following 
formula: 
 
 
£25 for domestic and non 
domestic customers, plus 
£25 for each further 12 
hours up to a cap of £200 
per customer 
GS12* 
 
Supply restoration: 
Highlands and Islands 
(Regulation 7) 
Supply must be restored within 18 hours, 
otherwise a payment must be made 
 
£50 for domestic 
customers and £100 for 
non-domestic customers, 
plus £25 for each further 
12 hours 
* Customers need to claim under these standards, for the remaining standards payments are automatic 
Table 6: Guaranteed standards of performance 
Source: Ofgem (2005) 
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5.3 Network energy losses 
 
The term energy loss refers to physical losses (as heat, noise, or theft) during 
distribution through a network. Energy losses can be broken down into variable, fixed, 
and non-technical losses. The value of losses can, however, vary according to time of 
day and time of year. Losses also contribute to the emissions of pollutants and 
greenhouse gases. 
 
The UK has higher transmission and distribution losses than countries such as Germany, 
France, Italy and United States, but lower than Spain, Canada and Ireland (Ofgem, 
2003b). Approximately 7 percent of electricity transported in the U.K. is reported as 
electrical losses (Ofgem, 2003b).12 According to one estimate, energy losses in the 
distribution networks are around £900 million i.e. equivalent to 5 percent of the average 
annual electricity bill (Ofgem, 2005). 
 
Figure 11 shows that, since liberalisation, energy losses, as percentage of energy 
delivered, in distribution networks has gradually declined. In particular, there is a 
marked reduction in losses during the 2001/02-2003/04 period. 
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Figure 11: Distribution losses in the UK as percentage of energy delivered 
Source: Ofgem 
 
The distribution price control review also provides incentives for reducing losses in 
distribution networks. There has been a significant improvement in the loss percentage 
during the third price control period. The distribution losses targets were set from the 
                                                          
12 This section draws mainly on Yu, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2007). 
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first through to the second and third price control reviews (Ofgem, 1999b). Each DNO 
is evaluated based on a yardstick loss figure derived by taking total GWh losses for all 
firms and constructing a composite explanatory variable weighted on GWh (70%), 
transformer capacity (20%), and network length (10%). 
 
Financial penalties up to 0.25 percent of revenue are imposed on distribution firms if 
losses exceed the yardstick losses. Rewards are available for firms if the losses have 
decreased below yardstick levels (Ofgem, 1999b). Currently, an additional financial 
rewards and penalties of the incentive at 2.9 pence per kWh is applied to the difference 
between the actual and the target level of losses valued by the incentive rate in the first 
year. The reward and penalty falls in a straight line over ten years. 
 
Starting from the fourth price control period, for every kWh of loss reduction (increase), 
DNOs will be rewarded (penalized) at 4.8 pence per kWh (in 2004/05 prices). Losses 
targets are set between the ranges of 4.96% to 8.73% among DNOs (Ofgem, 2004b). 
The target level of losses is based on a proportion of units distributed and is fixed for 
five years. The fixed target would be based on past performance of the DNO, as 
measured by the average proportion of energy lost between 1994/95 and 2003/04. The 
rolling retention mechanism will be in place to ensure that DNOs receive full benefit of 
incremental improvements in performance for a period of 5 years. 
 
In many cases, DNOs will face conflicting incentives on losses, capital efficiency, 
operating efficiency, and quality of supply. For example, due to the location of system 
open points, the loss-related incentives can conflict with the quality of service 
incentives. Such conflict can also occur between Capex and losses where firms may 
prefer to invest in conventional transformers rather than low-loss transformers in order 
to reduce expenditures (Ofgem, 2003b). 
 
 
5.4 Incentivising efficient new Investments 
 
As mentioned earlier, minimising the cost of network expansion and upgrade is a major 
issue for the regulators and benchmarking of new investment can be an increasingly 
important part of the price control process. 
 
The investment efficiency incentive scheme adopted by Ofgem as part of the 2005-2010 
distribution price control review exhibits some flexibility for firms to perform better 
than their allowed and expected investment needs. This approach also enable the firms, 
when possible, to take the trade-offs with operating expenditures into consideration. 
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At the same time, for the 2005-10 price control review, the regulator has allowed a 
substantial increase in capital investments aimed at modernisation of the networks. The 
45% increase in capital expenditure allowance from £3,882 million for the 2000-05 
review period to £5,623 million (excluding quality of service) has resulted in a positive 
average X-factor for the sector as a whole for the first time.13 The increase in allowed 
investments has been accompanied by an incentive scheme that is based on allowing 
higher returns on actual investments for making lower investments than the target level. 
 
The distribution price control review introduced a sliding scale system for capital 
investment incentives. The incentives are outlined in Table 8. PB Power were the 
engineering consultants who reviewed the companies capital expenditure plans. The 
higher the ratio selected by the company to PB Power’s assessment the weaker the 
incentive if the company actually delivered its investment below budget. Therefore, a 
company that selected as its base allowed revenue the lowest ratio of its cost to PB 
Power’s estimate could keep 40% of any under-spend while the company that selected 
the highest ratio could only keep 20% of any under-spend. Thus a company who 
estimated that it needed to spend £140m when PB Power estimated only £100m was 
required to have a base target of £115m. If the company actually achieved £100m it 
would receive £100m plus an incentive payment of £0.6m. By contrast a company that 
said it needed £100m against PB Power’s £100m and then actually achieved £100m 
would receive a £100m plus an incentive payment of £4.5m. This is a menu of contracts 
approach to regulation which encourages companies to more correctly reveal the true 
estimated cost of capital investments.14
 
An investment increase of such magnitude may appear as being rather generous to 
companies. However, this is a reminder that conventional benchmarking methods do not 
necessarily send proper signals to the regulator about the need for asset renewal and 
thus for increased capital investments across the sector as a whole. It may be argued that 
by limiting the benchmarking exercise to Opex Ofgem have maintained the flexibility to 
respond to the cyclical nature of investments in distribution networks and need for an 
overall increase in capital investments (Figure 12). In Norway, on the other hand, as 
shown in Bye and Hope (2005), the introduction of rate of return regulation in 1991 and 
subsequently the benchmarking based regime incentive regulation in 1997 resulted in a 
decline in network investments (Figure 13). 
 
 
13 48% increase including investments earmarked for quality of service. 
14 See Baron (1989). 
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Table 8: Sliding scale matrix for incentivising Capex in the UK DNOs by  
Ofgem in 2005-2010 distribution price control review 
Source: Ofgem (2004b, p. 87) 
 
Dalen (1998) examines investment incentives of firms under yardstick competition 
while distinguishing between industry-specific and firm-specific investments. The paper 
suggests that under yardstick competition, industry-specific investments with spill-overs 
that benefit all firms are reduced. At the same time, firm-specific investments that only 
improve the relative efficiency of the individual firm will increase. An example of 
industry-specific type of investments is research and development (R&D) and 
innovation spending, which despite their relatively small share in total spending have 
significant long-term efficiency benefits for the sector as a whole. 
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Figure 12: Capital investment in the UK electricity distribution network 
Source: Ofgem (2006) 
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Figure 13: Investment in network capacity. Mill NOK (2002 prices) 
Source: Bye and Hope (2005) 
 
It is conceivable that firms will have a reduced incentive to use their private information 
and invest in technologies that may not be explicitly rewarded in the price control 
model as the regulator may extract the rents from such investments ex-post. The 
magnitude of such industry-specific investments in electricity distribution utilities is, 
however, likely to be low but the benefits could be disproportionate to the expenditure. 
In 2004 Ofgem introduced the possibility for DNOs to recover up to 0.5% of their 
revenue p.a. to fund R&D investments under the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI).  
Mott Macdonald BPI (2004) estimated the net present value of benefits from the IFI 
scheme at about £386m as opposed to an increase in consumer expenditure of £57m. 
 
Thus, Ofgem’s benchmarking model can be described as a short-term efficiency 
benchmarking model as it includes only operating costs. The long lead times necessary 
for the firms to achieve any new asset structure in the long-run must be achieved 
through the allowed capital expenditure. 
 
Achieving long-term efficiency improvements can involve short-term increases in 
Capex and/or Opex expenditures that may not generate immediate efficiency 
improvements. Indeed, short-term expenditure increases can deteriorate the firms’ short-
term relative performance. This can in turn prevent firms from embarking on efficiency 
improving investments that have long-term gains. More specifically, long-term 
efficiency improvement targets should be facilitated with incentives allowing the firms 
to keep the benefits of efficiency gains. 
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The mismatch between the long-term horizon of investments and short price control 
periods can have a negative effect on the cost of financing investments (Ofwat/Ofgem, 
2006). Longer regulatory periods (e.g. seven or ten years) can reduce uncertainty with 
regards to long-term investments and retaining their benefits. However, even 
substantially longer regulatory review periods will likely not fully incentivise 
investments in innovations with even longer payback periods. 
 
 
6. Lessons of Experience from Britain 
 
Judging by the British experience, what lessons can be drawn from the experience of the 
past 16 years with incentive regulation for other countries that have not yet embarked on 
regulatory reform? We can derive some general insights from the cumulative experience 
with incentive regulation of networks from Britain and around the world. 
 
New incentive regulation and benchmarking models have grown out of the conventional 
regulation models and the need for new approaches to stimulate efficiency improvement 
in the monopoly segments of reformed industries. It is likely that different parallel 
national models will exist in different countries. However, the constant interaction 
between the regulators and firms and the cumulative experience from around the world 
will ensure that network regulation will continue to evolve and innovate. Finally, the 
“consultative” or ‘constructive engagement’ approach which has been suggested as an 
alternative to mainstream models of regulation in certain circumstances15. The approach 
is based on engaging the main stakeholders in the process of regulation. It is, however, 
too early to judge whether this represents a major step in the evolution of regulation. 
Figure 13 indicates the incentive properties of different regulation models. 
 
It is rather important that the reform framework and regulatory approach take the 
countries’ institutional endowment and capacity into consideration. At the same time, it 
is crucial to recognize that compromising on main economic features of regulation can 
reduce its effectiveness. In this regard, a transparent set of rules, processes, and 
outcomes are particularly important. In countries without the tradition of independent 
regulation, the new regulator may be weak in terms of mandate and authority. In such 
cases, transparency is particularly important as insight into the procedures and process 
will reduce the possibility of regulatory capture. For example, incentive regulation and 
benchmarking were first practised and have been more successful in the countries such 
as the UK and Norway with a tradition of open and transparent bureaucratic systems. In 
15 See Civil Aviation Authority (2005) for a description of this model in the case of UK airports. 
 38
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
the case of regulation this increases the checks and balances of the process and ensures 
a credible process which is crucial to any regulatory framework. 
 
 
Figure 13: The evolution pattern of regulation 
Source: Viljainen (2005) 
 
Network regulation can play a significant role in reducing the cost of electricity supply. 
In the UK the efficiency gains from incentive regulation of the distribution networks are 
at least comparable (in terms of relative share in final price) to those gained from 
competition in the wholesale markets.  New Zealand, by contrast, where the reform 
failed to properly regulate the distribution companies saw the reform gains achieved in 
the generation sector captured by the distribution companies as higher profits (see 
Bertrand and Twaddle, 2006). 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the British model of distribution network 
incentive regulation has brought about significant price reductions to the customers. 
Admittedly, in the initial years the companies made large profits which with the benefits 
of hindsight could have been avoided. This can partly be attributed to underestimation 
of the potential for efficiency improvement in the networks, the focus on implementing 
competition in generation and the price formulae set out by the government as part of 
the selling off the assets rather than to ineffectiveness of incentive regulation per se. 
 
As noted above, through the subsequent price control reviews, the British network 
regulation model has successfully: substantially reduced distribution access charges, 
maintained and improved quality of service, and ensured sufficient investments. A 
tough regime of operating expenditure benchmarking has meant that the benchmarked 
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share of total revenues has consistently been reduced. This has focussed regulation on 
dealing effectively with the persistent question of investment adequacy and the long-
term reliability of the networks. The question of how to correctly incentivise new 
investments, especially as these become more significant due to replacement cycles and 
the demands of new distributed/renewable generation, emerges as an important 
challenge to both incentive regulation approach and benchmarking. 
 
Although the fragmented regulation and benchmarking approach consisting of the 
benchmarking of operating expenditures, the review of capital investment plans, and 
penalty/reward schemes for quality of service and network energy losses do not strictly 
conform to an ideal integrated theoretical framework, this approach has performed well 
and has given the regulator flexibility to address and incentivise specific aspects of 
network regulation. 
 
As noted in Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), the process of liberalisation towards the internal 
electricity market in the European Union is currently the only cross-country broad 
reform process in progress. Although the pace of the EU-wide reform has been slow, 
the centralised initiatives and the Electricity Directives have managed to maintain some 
momentum in the process. In the absence of EU-led initiatives, many member countries 
would have undertaken considerably less progressive reform measures. For example, 
Switzerland by the virtue of not being a member of the EU has not been obliged to take 
part in the liberalisation of the European electricity sector liberalisation. In the absence 
of external pressure from the EU, the domestic support has not been sufficiently strong 
to press forward a reform agenda. 
 
But does this mean that countries like Switzerland have foregone improvement in terms 
of the efficiency of the sector or economic competitiveness? The answer may lie partly 
in the current efficiency level of the sector and partly in the potential for improvement 
in the sector. The latter must be carefully viewed within the backdrop of institutional 
factors that may constraint implementation of a workable reform. A partially 
implemented reform can indeed be less desirable than a non-reformed sector. The 
history of the British electricity distribution networks shows that the past nationalisation 
harmonized the technical standards and reduced the number of networks over time 
making some potential economies of scale available. This facilitated the subsequent 
privatisation and introduction of incentive regulation in the UK. 
 
The following more specific insights from the electricity distribution sector reform in 
Britain and elsewhere offer several insights and lessons of experience for other 
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countries at earlier stages of reform in general and incentive regulation of networks in 
particular. 
 
• Incentive regulation and the wider reform - In the implementation of incentive 
regulation for the distribution networks, it is not necessary to introduce the 
reform steps in the same order as in the British case. Contrary to common 
practice worldwide, it is not imperative to implement incentive regulation of 
distribution networks at the same time as or after introducing competition in the 
wholesale and retail markets. A crucial role of the distribution system in reforms 
is to provide regulated third-party access for wholesale and retail market 
competition over the networks. However, access to networks is an entirely 
different matter from incentive regulation of them. Neither is privatisation a 
prerequisite for implementing incentive regulation as the publicly owned 
Norwegian and Dutch electricity distribution networks illustrate. It may, 
however, be useful to distinguish between local and municipal ownership on the 
one hand and state ownership on the other as the latter may be less efficient. It 
then follows that, if the introduction of competition is not feasible or desirable, 
there is no reason for not considering incentive regulation of the networks on its 
own merits. Likewise, lack of willingness or support for privatisation of 
networks should not be an obstacle for incentive regulation of this.16 
 
• Reform policy - A recent OECD report on regulatory reform in Switzerland 
states that “An evolutionary process is underway, partly in anticipation of 
market opening, toward consolidation, partnership and cooperation, and sale of 
public equity.” (OECD, 2005, p.126). There is reason to believe that ad hoc and 
unsupervised structural and positioning in advance and anticipation of the actual 
reform are not only unhelpful but are also likely to constrain and complicate the 
implementation of a future reform and the tasks of the regulator. Any 
restructuring or reorganisation with a view to a reform should ideally take place 
under the oversight of an independent sector regulator (although this was not the 
case in Britain) and as part of a coherent reform agenda. The British reform 
benefited greatly from initially having 14 independent, roughly comparable, 
DNOs to regulate. Such early developments can create new vested interests and 
put in place ineffective structures that regulation cannot easily alter or correct 
 
16 The case of incentive regulation of municipal and county owned utilities in Nordic countries is 
testimony to this. However the consequences of applying incentive regulation – designed for profit 
maximising private companies - to locally/publicly owned companies may need to be better understood. 
See Magnus (2000) for a discussion of the case of introduction of incentive regulation for locally owned 
utilities in Norway. 
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rds an effective market 
can be frustrated in the absence of clear reform policies. 
 
• 
on model that has resulted in major disputes between the 
regulator and firms. 
 
• 
business. Structural 
shortcomings cannot easily be mitigated by other means. 
 
• 
distribution utilities. This approach, though perhaps not perfect, is in contrast to 
their effect. This is due to the fact that capital has proven significantly more 
mobile and proactive than the process of rule-making for reforms. The sectoral 
and cross-sectoral consolidations in the EU where firms have acted to position 
themselves ahead of the actual reform or establishment of strong independent 
regulator (as in Germany) illustrate how progress towa
Legislation and independent regulation - The reform law should be clear 
regarding the aims of the reform and the regulator’s mandate and areas over 
which it should have authority. Independent regulation has become the 
prerequisite and cornerstone of reform of infrastructure and network industries. 
Establishment of an independent regulatory authority should take place by 
mandate from and soon after the necessary legal base is in place. In the 
Netherlands, lack of legislative clarity with regards to the benchmarking 
approach led to legal challenges by the utilities and new legislation (Nillesen 
and Pollitt, 2007). At the same time, legislation should avoid being too specific 
on some central matters that should normally be the domain of regulatory 
discretion. For example, whether the regulator should use specific approaches to 
incentive regulation or use benchmarking or perhaps international benchmarking 
needs to be the preserve of the independent regulator. In Sweden, by requiring 
ex-post regulation of distribution networks, the law has in part led to adoption of 
an incentive regulati
Unbundling and ring-fencing distribution - Effective separation of the 
networks from the competitive segments is crucial. Legal separation of the 
networks and ring-fencing of the distribution assets and costs from the rest of 
vertically integrated structures is essential for effective incentive regulation 
schemes and benchmarking. This should ideally be done as early as possible and 
prior to the start of incentive regulation to avoid strategic behaviour. Jamasb, 
Nillesen, and Pollitt (2003) show that regulators have identified definition and 
allocation of distribution costs and assets as important in incentive regulation 
and benchmarking. Ofgem has invested considerable effort in effective 
separation on distribution from supply (retailing) 
Quality of service – The use of performance targets combined with a penalty 
and reward incentive system has improved the quality of service in the UK 
 42
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                          
a purely cost-oriented benchmarking, which could lead to perverse economic 
incentives. It is important for countries to take quality of service and related 
investments into account when introducing incentive regulation. The British 
example shows that incentive regulation can also be effective for improving 
quality of service and security of supply of the networks. 
 
• Information and data requirement - Availability of high quality data is crucial 
to a well functioning incentive regulation scheme and all reforms have had to 
spend considerable effort to improve the legal aspects of information disclosure 
and to improve the quality of data and standardisation of reporting formats. It 
should be noted that while benchmarking can reduce the information asymmetry 
between the regulator and the regulated firm, the information requirements can 
still be significant. This is particularly true for countries where the number of 
firms is large. As the information base for many of smaller firms is limited, the 
time between the present and a future reform is well-spent on establishing the 
legal basis for information disclosure requirements and standardising and 
simplifying the collection of data. Incentive regulation can, in some respects, be 
built on less, but high quality, information as opposed to traditional rate of return 
regulation that can be rather information intensive.17 
 
• Number of networks and priorities – Some countries such as Germany, Nordic 
countries, and Switzerland have a large number of utilities. This provides a 
suitable basis for the use of advanced benchmarking techniques and without 
necessarily having to recourse to international benchmarking. There are about 
900 distribution utilities in the above two countries ranging from large networks 
in vertically integrated structures to very small municipal utilities. It is generally 
desirable for regulators to have a large number of utilities for comparison and 
efficiency benchmarking. Also, evidence suggests that companies need not to be 
very large to reach rather efficient scales (e.g. Growitsch et al., 2005). However, 
having a large number of very small networks can be inefficient from the scale 
efficiency point of view. For example, auditing and quality control of data will 
demand more resources. This may also have implications for the benchmarking 
approach. For example, control and approval of a large number of small utilities’ 
investment plans can be costly, lengthy, and complicated. It may be that a move 
towards a smaller number of roughly equally sized distribution companies is a 
desirable goal from the point of view of efficiency of system operation and 
regulation. 
17 This is illustrated by the substantial reporting requirements put on companies by FERC in the US. 
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A practical and pragmatic approach for introduction of incentive regulation is, 
therefore, to initially focus on regulation and benchmarking of a modest number 
of the largest companies that constitute a significant majority of total customers. 
Initially, the large majority of smaller utilities many of which may even lack 
suitable accounts for incentive regulation and benchmarking can only be 
subjected to standardisation of their accounts. The smallest networks may then 
gradually be encouraged to merge to improve scale efficiency, after merger they 
may be subjected to benchmarking. 
 
However, while acquiring uniform technical and financial data may be difficult, 
it is easier to focus on tariff and revenue data which are easier to determine. In 
many cases, the indirect pressure from the achievements of other regulated 
utilities should lead to some efficiency improvements in these utilities. In a 
transition period, simple measures such as comparison and publication of 
distribution tariffs are likely to produce some performance improvements in 
these utilities. Evidence from Germany with publication of distribution tariffs 
suggests some reduction in the highest tariffs - although the lowest tariffs 
showed signs of increase (Growitsch and Wein, 2005). 
 
• Economies of scale and rationalisation – Studies of economies of scale in 
electricity distribution networks suggest that these need not be very large to 
benefit from economies of scale (e.g. Growitsch et al, 2005). It is likely that 
technological progress has reduced the scale effect on the cost distribution 
networks. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no benefits 
from scale economies or rationalisation of the structure of the networks. 
Growisch et al. (2005) find that although the most efficient small firms are as 
efficient as the most efficient large firms, the dispersion of efficiencies is 
considerably greater for small firms. This would seem to be consistent with the 
view that sufficient managerial skills for a large number of small firms may not 
be available or affordable. 
 
Thus in countries which continue to have a very large number of small network 
utilities it is rather likely that there is scope for significant gains from 
rationalisation. Norway and the Netherlands have encouraged and achieved 
mergers and partnerships aimed at efficiency improvement among their 
distribution utilities. 
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Postscript: Electricity network regulation in the Future 
 
In closing, we note the impact of future innovation on network regulation. 
Technological progress has in the past and will continue in the future to transform the 
nature and economics of networks. It is therefore very important that any regulatory 
framework will provide the right incentives for innovation and adoption of new 
technologies in the networks. It is also important that the regulatory system is flexible. 
The UK system of regulation has performed well from 1990 to 2006. However it will 
need to evolve in the face of new technology and the challenge of demands from 
electricity consumers and producers for cleaner and more decentralised production (see 
Jamasb, Nuttall and Pollitt, 2006). 
 
Thus an important question is whether the UK regulation model provides the necessary 
incentives for innovation and accommodates the “active networks” of future with 
renewables, distributed generation, micro-generation, and active demand. Micro-
generation units installed by households, industrial CHP, decentralised renewable 
generation sources will impose new challenges on networks. 
 
This implies that European electricity regulators should take into account the power and 
long-term effects of incentive schemes in influencing the features and behaviour of 
regulated firms. In responding to the choice of benchmarking models and target 
variables firms are led to follow a certain path. This can mean a narrow focus on a 
limited number of strategic variables. Regulatory models will therefore need to be 
reviewed and evolve constantly to meet the needs of future networks. 
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